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Space Debris Sensor Recent Anomaly Attribution 
Scenario
-or-
A Cautionary Tale of How, While Trying to Measure the 
Source of One Type of Anomaly, We Ended Up 
Experiencing Anomalies of a Completely Different Kind…
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190000072 2019-08-30T04:50:43+00:00Z
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SDS Introduction
• The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is an instrument 
designed as a part of the DRAGONS program by NASA’s 
Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) to provide 
statistical in situ data on the orbital debris population 
that is too small for ground-based remote sensing 
– Information on debris ranging from 50 µm to 500 µm+ 
in size
– Estimates of this small debris population are currently 
based on inspection of exposed surfaces returned on 
Shuttle (retired 2011)
– Technology intended to provide data to be used to 
update the NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model 
(ORDEM)
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Orbital Debris Measurement Coverage:  SDS to address 
Data Gap at ISS altitudes as a technology demonstration
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• SDS combines dual-layer thin films, an acoustic sensor system, a resistive 
grid sensor system, and sensored backstop to provide real-time impact 
detection and recording capability
– Impact event observable data includes: Impact times, impact locations, hole size, and 
backstop energy/impulse
– Derived data includes: particle size, impact speed, impact direction, and qualitative and 
quantitative particle mass density
How Does SDS Work?
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SDS Introduction and Goals
• First flight demonstration of the Debris 
Resistive/Acoustic Grid Orbital NASA-Navy Sensor 
(DRAGONS) developed and matured by the ODPO
– While other debris sensors have been flown 
before, this combination of technologies to 
thoroughly characterize the debris is 
unprecedented
– The first flight demonstration in what is hoped to 
be a new generation of operational sensors flying 
at higher altitudes to fully characterize the debris 
environment
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SDS Introduction and Goals
• The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is a Class 1E NASA 
technology demonstration external payload aboard 
the International Space Station (ISS) 
– Limited budget
– Accelerated schedule
– Risk-managed experiment
• Primary goal – Technology demonstration
• Secondary goal – Take environment data
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NASA Class 1E Hardware Overview
• “E” for Experimental
• New flight hardware classification intended to 
streamline flight certification
• All the risk is assumed by the funding authority, in 
this case, the ISS Program Office (ISSPO) 
• Payload shall not perform mission critical functions
• Shall not compromise safety of ISS crew or vehicle 
or SpaceX Dragon launch vehicle
• This hardware classification development and 
deployment coincident with SDS development life 
cycle
• Also motivated by NASA Revolutionize ISS for 
Science and Technology (RISE) initiative
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SDS Overview
Principal Components & Vital Statistics
• Weight:
– Total: 267.69 kg / 590 lbs
– CEPA: 117.94 kg / 260 lbs
– SDS: 149.75 kg / 330 lbs
• Size:
– External Height: 67.56 inches 
– External Width: 47.92 inches 
(CEPA with handrails)
– External Depth:  53.00 inches 
(CEPA with handrails)
• Power
– 40W: SDS operating without 
heaters
– 155W: SDS operating with ISS 
heaters
– 100W: SDS non-operating with 
launch heaters
Columbus External Payload Adapter 
(CEPA; SpaceX OEM, SDS GFE)
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SDS Installation on ISS
• SDS launched on SpaceX 13 (Dec. 2017) and was robotically 
installed on 1 Jan. 2018
• Installation on the Columbus External Payload Facility (Col-EPF) 
in the ISS forward-facing (ram) direction  
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SDS Concept of Operations
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Timeline
• Initial checkout confirmed that all command and data 
interfaces were operational
• After hours of normal operation, SDS Health & Status 
data stopped updating and SDS did not respond to 
commands (Anomaly 1)
– Some of the software was still functional, because packets of 
information were still coming off of one interface
– However, command and control were no longer functioning
– Did not respond to software reboot commands
• The ODPO team determined that the only remaining option 
was to recycle the power
– A power recycle returned SDS to normal operations
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
13
Timeline
• We were able to replicate the lockup using the ground unit, 
and identified it as a software issue
– However, the instrument was not designed for software update
– The original cost estimate to have software configurable was 
determined not to be within the financial constraints of the program 
• The partial software lock repeated itself irregularly
– The power recycle was repeated each time the SDS Health & Status 
data stopped (65 times over 25 days)
• Finally, on January 26, 2018, SDS did not recover from three 
consecutive power recycle attempts (Anomaly 2)
• Attempts at power up between February 9, 2018 and June 26, 
2018 were also unsuccessful
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Anomaly Resolution
• The initial loss of Health & Status was identified as a 
partial software locked-up state
• Investigation focused on finding an indicator to 
preempt the lock-up by issuing a software reboot 
command
• Software bug was identified in a commercial software 
module that had passed multiple software tests 
during development testing
• While final software configuration successfully went 
through communication and full functional testing, a 
test of long enough duration to manifest the problem 
was not repeated for final configuration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
15
Anomaly Resolution
• There were several attempts to restore functionality, 
but there was no further response from the 
instrument
• As a direct result of the anomaly investigation (but 
after the fatal shutdown) a work-around was 
discovered whereby the software could have been 
updated in orbit prior to Anomaly 2
– This would have allowed us to correct Anomaly 1, 
preventing the need for frequent power cycling
– This method could be used in the future on ISS 
experiment packages using similar 
communications software
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Summary
• Efforts through June 2018 were focused on recovery
– Lessons learned being compiled
– Beginning to look into science data – small impacts were seen 
• SDS experienced two types of anomalies
– Anomaly 1 locked-up the software to a point where commanding and 
science data collection were not possible until a power cycle reset 
the payload
– Anomaly 2 is of an unknown cause when SDS failed to reset or 
respond after an operational power cycle 
• Other discrepancies have been identified, but it is not clear yet 
whether they are related
– Only one of the two heater circuits seems to be working
– Heater current draw is less than predicted
– Some wiggles in data telemetry
• All 40 acoustic sensors and all 32 resistive grid circuits were 
functioning and collecting good science prior to second anomaly
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Preliminary Lessons Learned
• Most probable cause of lost communication (Anomaly 2) was a 
hardware failure of the memory storage on the main interface 
processor
– Failure may have occurred due to repeated power cycles or 
environmental effects (radiation, plasma, etc.)
• The software bug in the file management software passed 
several tests during development.  Changes to the software 
caused the problem to manifest
– Additional long duration software testing pre-launch would have 
discovered the problem prior to flight
• SDS was not designed with a software update capability due to 
cost
– During anomaly resolution, the team learned that a low cost 
capability could have been added
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Technology Demonstration Summary (to date)
• Collected over 1300 acoustic detection files and 26 days of 
resistance/engineering data 
• Demonstrated impact detection in the flight environment
demonstrate the detection 
component ground testing flight experience
Impact Detection P P
impact time P P
impact location P P
projectile direction P ?
projectile speed P ?
projectile size P ?
projectile density (via impact 
energy)* P ?
* Projectile density may be demonstrable in a qualitative sense by number of layers penetrated
• Because we only 
had 1 month of 
data, we have 
not yet identified 
any impacts 
large enough to 
confirm these 
capabilities in 
space
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Conclusions
• SDS was a technology demonstrator flight payload 
– Demonstrated DRAGONS sensor technology for MMOD environmental 
measurements 
– Anomaly #1 did not compromise this demonstration 
• Analysis of SDS Health & Status and Science data continues to inform 
– Anomaly resolution effort (complete)
– General sensor-related engineering issues 
– MMOD environmental measurement
• Source of Anomaly #2 is still unknown
– Possible that power cycling contributed to it, but no way to confirm from 
available data
– Plausible environmental factors could have contributed to ultimate failure (e.g., 
radiation)
• Lessons Learned informs ongoing DRAGONS-type instrument  development
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Example of Flight Impact Acoustic Data
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Example of resistive grid temperatures
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Example of potential line break
